law-statutory-construction | interpretation | legislative intent | legislative intent |
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CASE LAW SNIPPETS
FROM RECENT SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.
Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. 2008). In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent as expressed in the statute’s language. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 312.005;
First Am. Title, 258 S.W.3d at 631-32. If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we apply
them according to their plain and common meaning. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621,
625-26 (Tex. 2008). Galbraith Engineering Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, No. 07-1051 (Tex. Jun. 26, 2009)
(Medina) (claim based on construction defect causing water damage barred by statute of repose)(statute of
repose vs. statute of limitations)
GALBRAITH ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC. v. SAM POCHUCHA AND JEAN POCHUCHA; from Bexar
County; 4th district (04-07-00119-CV, 243 SW3d 138, 09-12-07)
motion for leave to file response to post submission brief granted
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court. [pdf 11pgs]
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep’t v. Shumake, 199 S.W.
3d 279, 284. (Tex. 2006). Because the court of appeals erred in construing the word “copy” in section 14.005(a)
(2) to mean photocopies only and in dismissing the inmate’s claim based upon that erroneous construction, we
grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Garrett v. Borden, No. 08-0506 (Tex. May 1, 2009)(per curiam)(statutory construction; what qualifies as a copy
required by the applicable prison inmate litigation statute?)
Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000) (refusing to presume that the Legislature
intended a redundancy); Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1987) (noting that we must give
effect to all a statute’s words). As noted by the dissent in the court of appeals, “[t]he savings clause cannot be
reasonably read to bar the prosecution only of suits taxing authorities had prosecuted to completion under prior
law because these suits were already barred by the law of res judicata.” 236 S.W.3d at 388 (Keyes, J. dissenting)
(emphasis in original). Old Farms Owners Assn., Inc. v. HISD, No. 07-0924 (Tex. 2009)(per curiam)(tax suit, tax bill
mailed to incorrect address, penalties, statutory construction)
Statutory construction is a legal question, which we review de novo. State ex rel. State Dep’t of Highways
& Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). In doing this, we “give effect to all [a statute’s]
words and, if possible, do not treat any statutory language as mere surplusage.” State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d
279, 287 (Tex. 2006). In re Caballero, No. 07-0484 (Tex. Dec. 19, 2008)(Green)(attorney discipline, disbarment)
Statutory construction is a legal question we review de novo. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex.
2008). In construing statutes, we ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the
language of the statute. Id. (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006)). We use definitions
prescribed by the Legislature. Id. (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(b)(Vernon 2005)). Otherwise, we
construe the statute's words according to their plain and common meaning. Id. (citing Texas Dep't of Transp. v.
City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2004)). 08-0728
ELIZABETH W. BUFKIN v. EDWARD O. BUFKIN, JR.; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-06-01719-CV, 259 SW3d 343, 07-01-08) 2
petitions, pet. denied Nov. 2008)(prejudgment interest, admissibility of expert testimony, harm analysis of evidentiary ruling by trial
court, divorce fault grounds, prenup, stipulation agreement)
In construing statutes we presume that each word in the statute was put there for a purpose and that
each word not in the statute was omitted for a purpose. See Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Bd., 471 S.W.
2d 570, 573 (Tex. 1971). The statute does not contain language placing the burden of proof on a particular party
in regard to the factors, as was the situation with the prior version. Nor does the statute require that a party prove
each factor of section 71.051(b). The statute simply requires the trial court to consider the factors, and it must do
so to the extent the factors apply. To the extent evidence is necessary to support the positions of the parties, the
trial court must base its findings and decision on the weight of the evidence, and certainly is entitled to take into
account the presence or absence of evidence as to some issue or position of a party.
n Re G.E. Co., No. 07-0195 (Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) (Phil Johnson)
(forum non conveniens mandamus granted, asbestos suit)
Statutory construction is a legal question we review de novo. In construing statutes, we ascertain and give effect
to the Legislature’s intent as expressed by the language of the statute. See State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279,
284 (Tex. 2006). We use definitions prescribed by the Legislature and any technical or particular meaning the
words have acquired. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011(b). Otherwise, we construe the statute’s words according to
their plain and common meaning, Texas Department of Transportation v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637,
642 (Tex. 2004), unless a contrary intention is apparent from the context, Taylor v. Firemen’s and Policemen’s
Civil Service Commission of City of Lubbock, 616 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981), or unless such a construction
leads to absurd results. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2004); see also
Tex. Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 177 (Tex. 2004) (noting
that when statutory text is unambiguous, courts must adopt the interpretation supported by the statute’s plain
language unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results). We presume the Legislature intended a just
and reasonable result by enacting the statute. Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(3).[6] When a statute’s language is
clear and unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the
language. See St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997); Ex parte Roloff, 510 S.W.
2d 913, 915 (Tex. 1974).
City of Rockwall, Texas v. Hughes, No. 05-0126 (Tex. Jan 25, 2008) (Johnson) (annexation, arbitration
construction of statutory provision governing arbitration of municipal annexation disputes)
THE CITY OF ROCKWALL, TEXAS v. VESTER T. HUGHES, AS SOLE INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF W. W. CARUTH, DECEASED; from Rockwall County; 5th district (05-04-01562-CV, 153 S.W.3d 709,
01-20-2005)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Wainwright, Justice
Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Willett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, and Justice Brister joined.
In construing statutes, this Court starts with the plain language of the statute. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d
741, 745 (Tex. 2003). The language of section 85.321 clearly creates a private cause of action. A party whose
interest in property is damaged by another party violating provisions of a conservation law of this state or a
Railroad Commission rule or order “may sue for and recover damages” and other relief to which the party may be
entitled. Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 85.321. Section 85.321 also expressly provides a defense to civil actions for lease
owners and operators acting as a reasonably prudent operator would act under the same or similar
circumstances, adding more credence to the conclusion that section 85.321 creates a private cause of action. Id.
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., No. 05-0729 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(Wainright)(oil and gas law,
statutory cause of action for improperly plugging well, standing of subsequent lessee)