law property tax litigation | appeals | ad valorem tax appeal | judicial review suit | timeliness | deadline

RECENT TEXAS SUPREME COURT TAX AND TAXING POWER DECISIONS

Old Farms Owners Assn., Inc. v. HISD, No. 07-0924 (Tex. 2009)(per curiam)
(
tax suit, tax bill mailed to incorrect address, penalties, statutory construction, effect of nonsuit)
OLD FARMS OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND SUSAN C. LEE, TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST CREATED
UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE WILL OF KATHERINE P. BARNHART, DECEASED v. HOUSTON INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.; from Harris County; 1st district (01-04-00538-CV, 236 SW3d 375, 07-26-07)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and reinstates the trial court's
judgment.
Per Curiam Opinion

Lowenberg v. City of Dallas, No. 06-0310 (Tex. Mar. 28, 2008)(per curiam)(illegal fee, tax refund suit, takings
claim, declaratory judgment, UDJA attorney's fees)
JIM LOWENBERG, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED v. CITY OF DALLAS;
from Dallas County; 11th district (11-03-00061-CV, 187 S.W.3d 777, 03-01-06)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.

Nueces County v. San Patricio County, No. 07-0166 (Tex. Jan. 25, 2008)(per curiam)
(
governmental immunity, county vs county dispute over wrongfully collected property taxes)
NUECES COUNTY v. SAN PATRICIO COUNTY; from Refugio County; 13th district (13-05-00022 CV, 214 S.W.
3d 536, 12-07-2006)
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petition for review and without
hearing oral argument, the Court vacates the court of appeals' judgment and renders judgment.


PETITIONS DENIED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT

08-0708          
BERNARD DOLENZ v. DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND DALLAS COUNTY APPRAISAL
REVIEW BOARD; from Dallas County; 5th district (05‑07‑00885‑CV, 259 SW3d 331, 06‑30‑08, pet. denied
Oct 2008)(
subject-matter jurisdiction, property tax appeal, administrative remedies, timeliness) (religous
organization exemption)
In this
ad valorem tax case, Bernard Dolenz appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his claims against
the
Dallas Central Appraisal District and the Dallas County Appraisal Review Board for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.

Appellant failed to comply with section 42.21 of the Tax Code. Section 42.21 requires a party bringing an
appeal of an appraisal review board decision to file a petition for review in district court within forty-five days
after the party received notice that a final appealable order was entered. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.21(a)
(Vernon 2008). The failure to file the petition for review timely deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the
claim. Appraisal Rev. Bd. v. Int'l Church of Foursquare Gospel, 719 S.W.2d 160, 160 (Tex. 1986) (per
curiam); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1995,
writ denied).

In this case, the
appraisal review board rejected appellant's and the Trust's appeals of the request for
exemption
on September 29 and November 17, 2005. Appellant, as trustee of the Trust, filed a petition for
review on November 4, 2005, but appellant did not file his suit on his own behalf until June 6, 2006, well
outside the forty-five-day deadline. Because
appellant did not timely file suit, the district court lacked
jurisdiction over appellant's appeal of the appraisal review board's denial of his protests.

Appellant argues that if the Tax Code's provisions leave the district court without jurisdiction to adjudicate his
appeal of the appraisal review board's
denial of the exemption for the property, then those provisions
violate his rights to due process, to access to the courts, and to open courts as guaranteed by the United
States and Texas constitutions. The Texas courts have held that the Tax Code's provisions do not deny a
taxpayer these rights. See Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 808 S.W.2d 169, 172
(Tex. App.-El Paso), rev'd in part on other grounds, 826 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam).

We conclude the trial court did not err in granting appellees' plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing appellant's
suit for want of jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
                                                
08-0491  
MALCOLM L. SHAW v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, DALLAS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, PARKLAND
HOSPITAL DISTRICT, DALLAS COUNTY SCHOOL EQUALIZATION FUND, CITY OF DALLAS AND DALLAS
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; from Dallas County; 5th district (
05-07-00366-CV, 251 SW3d 165, 04-09-
08)(property tax delinquency litigation,
attorney's fees under UDJA)
as supplemented
Shaw appeals the trial court's judgment denying his claim for attorney's fees in a suit to collect delinquent ad
valorem taxes.  We affirm.

08-0462          
OUTREACH HOUSING CORPORATION/DESOTO I, LTD. v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
from Dallas County; 5th district (05-07-00288-CV, 251 SW3d 152, 03-25-08, pet. denied Aug 2008) (Justice
Hecht not sitting) (
property tax, denial of partial property tax exemption)

08-0034  
CARL R. DAILY v. BOWIE COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT; from Bowie County; 6th district
(
06-07-00055-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-28-07, pet. denied Feb 2008) (tax appraisal protest appeal)
Carl R. Daily appealed a determination of the tax evaluations placed on his properties by the Bowie County
Appraisal District (Bowie CAD) as ratified by the Bowie County Appraisal Review Board. After a trial before
the court, he was granted partial relief by the trial judge (1) and appeals the sufficiency of the relief and the
finding denying him other relief. We affirm the judgment.
Daily, appearing pro se, first attempted to file an appellant's brief, which was rejected as far too lengthy, and
he was ordered to re-brief; he subsequently filed a shorter brief which, for the most part, is disorganized,
confusing, and extraordinarily difficult to comprehend. Likewise, at trial, it is almost impossible to determine
from the record at which point Daily abandons the role of his own advocate and attempts to assume the role
of a witness. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant's brief to contain "a clear and
concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record." Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(h). On appeal, as at trial, the pro se appellant must properly present his case. Plummer v.
Reeves, 93 S.W.3d 930, 931 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2003, pet. denied); Karen Corp. v. Burlington N. and Sante
Fe Ry. Co., 107 S.W.3d 118, 125 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). A
pro se litigant is obligated to
comport with the Rules of Procedure just as one represented by an attorney is required to comply with them.
Holt v. F.F. Enters., 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, to the extent that we are able to glean the nature of Daily's complaints,
we attempt to address them.

07-0979  
ALLEN R. HARTMAN & LISA HARTMAN v. HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND THE APPRAISAL
REVIEW BOARD OF THE HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT; from Harris County; 1st district (01-06-
01074-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 10-11-07, pet. denied Feb. 2008)(tax protest case, judicial review)
Appellants, Allen R Hartman and Lisa Hartman, sued appellees, Harris County Appraisal District (HCAD) and
the Appraisal Review Board of the Harris County Appraisal District (HCARB), alleging that their real property
was
appraised excessively and unequally for tax year 2005. Appellees moved for summary judgment,
asserting that the appraised value was the result of an agreement between the parties and, therefore, under
section 1.111(e) of the Tax Code, could not be contested in a judicial appeal. The trial court granted
appellees' motion and rendered judgment in their favor. In a single point of error, the Hartmans contend that
the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment for three reasons: (1) there was no agreement reached
between the parties; (2) the valuation was determined by HCARB, giving the Hartmans a statutory right to
appeal under section 42.01of the Tax Code; and (3) the Hartmans'
due-process rights were violated by the
application of section 1.111(e) of the Tax Code by denying their right to a judicial appeal. We affirm.

08-0004  
LYLE AND DEBORAH HODGE v. DALLAS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT; from Dallas County; 5th district
(05-06-01418-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 11-19-07,
pet. denied Feb 2008) )(property tax appeal, homestead
exemption)
In this ad valorem tax case, Lyle and Deborah Hodge appeal the trial court's adverse judgment on their
claims against the Dallas Central Appraisal District (DCAD). In three issues, the Hodges challenge the trial
court's judgment regarding a
homestead exemption, proration of taxes, and appraisal value. In a
fourth issue, they complain the trial court used an incorrect standard when weighing evidence.

07-1052  
GALVESTON CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND GALVESTON CENTRAL APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD
v. MHCB (USA) LEASING AND FINANCE CORP. AND VALERO TEXAS-REFINING, L.P.; from Galveston
County; 1st district (01-06-00529-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 09-20-07, pet. denied Feb 2008)
(property tax appraisal, refinery, plea to the jurisdiction,
declaratory judgment, UDJA)

07-0854          
EXCEL AUTO AND TRUCK LEASING, LLP v. ALIEF INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.; from Harris
County; 1st district (01-04-01185-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 08-31-07,
pet. denied Jan 2008) (property tax cases)
In this suit for
delinquent ad valorem taxes, Excel Auto & Truck Leasing, L.L.P., appellant/taxpayer,
complains of the trial court's granting summary judgment in favor of the various taxing units, appellees. In
three issues, Excel argues that the trial court erred (1) in finding that it was the owner of the vehicles and
liable for ad valorem taxes; (2) in finding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact as to
ownership of the vehicles; and (3) in granting summary judgment to Pasadena Independent School District
("ISD"), which filed no Motion for Summary Judgment, rendering the judgment interlocutory. We affirm.