law-standing-to-bring-appeal or standing argument raised on appeal | standing doctrine |

Generally, only parties of record have standing to appeal. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Huizar,
740 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. 1987). Standing requires that the parties have a real
controversy which can actually be determined by the relief sought.

Standing to Appeal

Generally, only parties of record have standing to appeal. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429, 430
(Tex. 1987). Standing requires that the parties have a real controversy which can actually be determined by the
relief sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). In other words, a
person has standing to appeal when he is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v.
Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996). As a party to the judgment, Matt has
standing to appeal. However, Matt is not personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong identified in his first five
issues on appeal, i.e., that Mary did not understand the proceedings. Therefore, we hold that Matt lacks
standing to complain on his own behalf of alleged violations of Mary’s procedural rights. See Goffney v. Houston
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 01-08-00063-CV, 2009 WL 2343250, *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 30, 2009,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant lacked standing on appeal to challenge alleged procedural due
process violations against third party).


Lack of standing to appeal argument

We will first address the City’s and taxing units’ contention that the Goffneys’ lack standing to bring this appeal
challenging the constitutionality of the August 7, 2000 hearing and the assessment of demolition fees against
them. Specifically, the City contends that the Goffneys do not have standing because they did not own title to
the property either at the time of this hearing or when the Sakowitz Street Apartment buildings were demolished.
Footnote

Generally, only parties of record have standing to appeal. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Huizar, 740 S.W.2d 429, 430
(Tex. 1987). Standing requires that the parties have a real controversy which can actually be determined by the
relief sought. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d. 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). In other words, a
person has standing to appeal when he is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v.
Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996).

In this case, the trial court signed a judgment for damages against the Goffneys based on evidence regarding
the outcome of the municipal hearing held on August 7, 2000, the City’s demolition of the Sakowitz Street
Apartment buildings, and the City’s assessment of the demolition costs. At trial, the City contended that it had
the authority to seek recovery of the demolition costs under CURB. Thus, regardless of whether the Goffneys
had legal title to the property at the time of the City’s hearing, demolition, and assessment of demolition costs,
they were personally aggrieved by the entry of a judgment holding them liable for costs incurred in connection
with the City’s actions, including its enforcement of CURB, and the resolution of the issues presented on appeal
challenging the legality of those actions will affect the Goffneys’ interests. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the Goffneys have standing to appeal the City’s and taxing units’ judgment. See Nevada Gold &
Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.).
Goffney v. HISD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 30, 2009)(Hanks)
(
delinquent property tax suit, standing to appeal, preservation of error re: constitutional challenge, due process
challenge, inadequate briefing results in waiver of argument on appeal)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks  
Before Justices Keyes, Hanks and Bland  
01-08-00063-CV Willie H. Goffney and Gladys R. Goffney v. Houston Independent School District   
Appeal from 165th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge:
Hon. Elizabeth Ray

The Goffneys have no standing to assert any constitutional due process rights belonging to the Master.
Generally, only the entity that has not been properly served with notice has standing to challenge the violation
of its procedural due process rights. See Sw. Constr. Receivables, Ltd. v. Regions Bank, 162 S.W.3d 859, 864
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied). With the single exception of the principle allowing an insurance
company to stand in the shoes of its insured, we have found nothing in our statutes or Texas caselaw that
supports the Goffneys’ position that a defendant in a civil suit has standing to challenge, on procedural due
process grounds, whether a third party has been properly given notice of a hearing; nor have the parties
directed this Court’s attention to any such authority. See id. No evidence in the record indicates that the Master
assigned his right to assert such a claim to the Goffneys. Based on the absence of authority and evidence in
support of the Goffneys’ novel standing argument, we reject their attempt to assert the Master’s procedural due
process claims.  Nor were the Goffneys personally deprived of procedural due process as a result of the lack of
notice to the Master. The record reflects that the lack of notice to the Master did not, in any way, prevent the
Goffneys from receiving notice or having an opportunity to air their complaints at that hearing regarding the City’
s conduct. It is undisputed that the Goffneys received actual notice that the City demolished the Sakowitz Street
Apartments because they posed “an immediate danger to the health, life or safety” of persons, and that a
hearing “concerning the actions taken” regarding this property by the City was set for August 7, 2000 at 8:30 a.
m. Footnote The notice advised the Goffneys that, at the hearing, they could “appear in person and/or be
represented by counsel” and that they would be able to “present testimony and cross examine all witnesses” at
the hearing. The Goffneys do not complain on appeal that the City’s hearing officer prevented them from
exercising any of these rights.


Previous owner of property lacked standing to challenge HCAD's appraisal and to file suit for judicial
review of board's decision in property tax protest; new owner's suit barred for failure to comply with
exhaustion-of-remedies requirement, which is jurisdictional under Texas Supreme Court precedent
Koll Bren Fund VI LP v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 28, 2008) (Radack) (property tax protest, tax
appeal, suit for judicial review, standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Property Tax Code)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Chief Justice Radack
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Bland
01-07-00321-CV Koll Bren Fund VI LP and Hartman 3100 Weslayan Acquisitions, LP v. Harris County Appraisal
District and The Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal District
Appeal from 113th District Court of Harris County (
Judge Hon. Patricia Hancock)


AUTHORITY TO BRING APPEAL -->
Rule 12, Tex. R. Civ. P. 12
Pessarra v. Seidler (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] July 17, 2008)(Keyes)
(
guardianship proceeding, attorney had no authority to file appeal)
DISMISS APPEAL: Opinion by Justice Keyes  
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Higley
01-06-01035-CV Tera Pessara v. Frank Wayne Seidler, Kimberly McMillian, Floyd Christian, Jr., Tera Hollie
Stowe and Janet Douvas Chafin
Appeal from Probate Court of Brazoria County


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