law-standing case law from Houston Courts of Appeals | standing for property tax protest purposes |
legal standing to bring appeal |
HOUSTON STANDING CASE LAW
“Standing consists of some interest peculiar to the person individually and not as a member of the general public.”
Billy B., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Galveston Wharves, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no
writ) (citing Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984)). More specifically, a person has standing to sue if: (1)
he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of
which he complains; (2) he has a direct relationship between the alleged injury and claim sought to be
adjudicated; (3) he has a personal stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff
some injury in fact, either economic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise; or (5) he is an appropriate party to
assert the public’s interest in the matter, as well as his own interest. Id. (citing Hous. Authority v. State ex rel.
Velasquez, 539 S.W.2d 911, 913–14 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Standing is a
component of subject matter jurisdiction. Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tex.1999).
Harris County Medical Examiner v. Saghian (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 8, 2009)(Hanks)
(autopsy, free exercise of religion, Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act, temporary injunction preventing
autopsy vacated, standing)
REVERSE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS:
Opinion by Justice Hanks
Before Justices Jennings, Hanks and Bland
01-07-00951-CV Harris County Medical Examiner Luis Arturo Sanchez, M.D. v. Afsaneh Saghian
Appeal from 133rd District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Lamar McCorkle
We note that the Medical Examiner never raised the issue of Afsaneh Saghian’s standing below. Nonetheless,
standing cannot be waived and may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or the court. West
Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 587 (Tex. 2003). In our review of standing, we
take the factual allegations in the petition as true and construe them in favor of the pleader. Juarez v. Texas Ass’n
of Sporting Officials, El Paso Chapter, 172 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (citing Texas Ass’
n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). In addition to the pleadings, we may also
consider relevant evidence to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d
547, 555 (Tex. 2000). We review the entire record to determine whether any evidence supports standing. Tex.
Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
Because standing is a threshold issue that is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction, we first address
Father's standing. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). In
addressing standing, we review the plaintiff's pleadings to determine whether the petition alleges facts that
affirmatively demonstrate our jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. at 446. We must construe the petition in the
plaintiff's favor and, if necessary, we will review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports standing.
See id.
Seureau v. Exxon Mobil Corp (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 16, 2008)(Brown)
(governmental immunity, sovereign immunity, summary judgment based on limitations,
no waiver of immunity by conduct or by sue and be sued language under Tooke v. City of Mexia)
Much of the underlying lawsuit relates to the 175 acres of land which belong exclusively to Son, and in which
Father retains no ownership interest. However, Father owned some of the land that was sold to ExxonMobil in
1966 and, in the underlying lawsuit, he seeks rescission of that earlier conveyance. Appellants have alleged that
the Port now owns some of the land that Father seeks to re-acquire, and have further contended that the Port, as
a participant in a joint enterprise, is legally responsible for ExxonMobil's alleged misdeeds. Because we construe
appellants' petition in their favor, we do not pass on the merits of their joint-enterprise allegations in this standing
discussion. See id.; see also Doncer v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex. App.- El Paso 2002, no pet.) (“It
should always be borne in mind that standing to sue does not mean a right to win, but merely a right to be heard
in court."); In re Smith, 260 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
We conclude that Father has a justiciable interest in the appeal of the trial court's order granting the Port's plea to
the jurisdiction. See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). Therefore, we hold
that Father has standing and that we have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the Port's
assertion of governmental immunity.
Standing is a necessary component of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass’n of Bus.
v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444–45 (Tex. 1993). To have standing a party must have a “sufficient
relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in its outcome.” Austin Nursing Ctr. v. Lovato, 171
S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (quoting 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Wright, Miller
& Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1559, 441 (2d ed. 1990)). A plaintiff must affirmatively show,
through pleadings and other evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry, a distinct interest in the asserted
conflict, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury. Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.
2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984); see County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). Whether a plaintiff
has standing is a legal question we determine de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928
(Tex. 1998).
Source: Alpert v. Riley (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 9, 2008)(Bland)
(probate court, trust management dispute, attorney's fees, standing)
Non-parent's and Grandparents standing in SAPCR
Related terms: grandparent standing for access and custody | lack of standing for want of injury |
"Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.
W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A party's lack of standing deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and
renders any trial court action void. Taub v. Aquila Sw. Pipeline Corp., 93 S.W.3d 451, 455 (Tex. App.- Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Whether a party has standing is a threshold issue, and one which we review de novo.
See In re SSJ-J, 153 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2004, no pet.); Hobbs v. Van Stavern, 249 S.W.3d
1, 3 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
Standing based on Statute
When standing has been conferred by statute, the statute itself should serve as the proper framework for a
standing analysis. In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding
[mand. denied]). We review the trial court's interpretation of applicable statutes de novo. See Johnson v. City of
Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. 1989). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give
effect to the legislative intent. See Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). If
possible, we must ascertain that intent from the language the Legislature used in the statute and not look to
extraneous matters for an intent the statute does not state. Id. If the meaning of the statutory language is
unambiguous, we adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the provision's words. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). We must not engage in forced or strained
construction; instead, we must yield to the plain sense of the words the Legislature chose. See id.
Source: In re Kevin J. Smith (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] July 3, 2008)(Frost) (mandamus)
(SAPCR, grandparent access mandamus, standing, dispute between grandparents)
Real, Actual, Justiciable Controversy required
Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443. Subject
matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Id. In analyzing issues of standing, we
focus on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit to have a "justiciable interest" in the
outcome. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). When a plaintiff is personally
aggrieved, he has standing. Id.
The standing doctrine requires that there be a "real controversy between the parties" which "will be actually
determined by the judicial declaration sought." Id. at 849 (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996)).
Standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute requires that the plaintiff have suffered some actual
or threatened injury under the statute that unconstitutionally restricts his own rights. Barshop v. Medina County
Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1996). "If a case becomes moot, the parties
lose standing to maintain their claims." Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (citing City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-06, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1666-67 (1983) (holding that inmates who had been
released from jail lacked cognizable interest in obtaining injunctive or declaratory relief)). A litigant's request for
relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act neither confers jurisdiction on a court nor changes a suit's underlying
nature, nor does it waive sovereign immunity to suits that seek to establish a basis for obtaining monetary
damages. See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855, 856; see also Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d at 159 (holding that trial court lacks
jurisdiction when legislature has not authorized trial court to grant relief sought).
In this case, Stephens agrees that the CSC reviewed and upheld his indefinite suspension, resulting in the
termination of his employment with the City, and that the CSC's order was final. The only question, therefore, is
whether the CSC's final order was appealable.
Stephens v. City of Houston (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 12, 2008)(Keyes)
(City of Houston litigation, public employment, declaratory judgment suit dismissed for lack of standing,
controversy over termination of employment moot, UDJA, termination of employment was final and not appealable.)
OTHER CASES INVOLVING STANDING ISSUES
BACM 2002 PBs Westpart Dr LP v. HCAD (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 21, 2009)(Frost)
(prior owner did not have standing to bring ad valorem tax protests appeal, judicial review suit, assumed name
theory as basis for substitution of correct party rejected, no standing - no subject matter jurisdiction).
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Frost
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Brock Yates and Frost
14-08-00493-CV BACM 2002 PB2 Westpark Dr LP, Houston Parkwest Place Ltd, as the Property Owners and the
Property Owners v. Harris County Appraisal District and the Appraisal Review Board of Harris County Appraisal
District Appeal from 11th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Mark Davidson
Stanford Dev. Corp. v. Stanford Condo Owners Ass'n (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan 29, 2009)(Radack)
(arbitration, non-signatory, condo association's standing to sue on behalf of members, bound by arb agreement)
REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS:
Opinion by Chief Justice Sherry Radack
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Nuchia and Higley
01-08-00240-CV Stanford Development Corporation v. Stanford Condominium Owners Association
Appeal from 333rd District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joseph Halbach
City of Galveston, Texas, and BP v. Saint-Paul, No. 01-06-00580-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 14, 2008)
(Alcala) (Open Meetings Act, standing, attorney's fees)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT IN PART, REVERSE TC JUDGMENT IN PART, AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Alcala
(Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Alcala)
The City of Galveston, Texas; BP Energy Company, Intervenor; Board of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves v.
Nancy Saint-Paul--Appeal from 122nd District Court of Galveston County (Judge Hon. John Ellisor)
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