law-takings-claim-inverse-condemnation | eminent domain condemnation | regulatory taking | appraisal methods
The Texas Constitution provides that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or
applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person.” Tex.
Const. art. I, § 17. Adequate compensation does not include profits generated by a business located on
condemned land. Herndon v. Hous. Auth., 261 S.W.2d 221, 222–23 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1953, writ ref’d).
07-0677
METROCARE EMS, L.P. v. STATE OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR DIVISION OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AND TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES; from Jefferson County; 9th district
(09-07-00010-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-07-07, pet denied Feb. 2008)
(governmental entities, sovereign immunity)
From all of the above-discussed jurisdictional evidence, we conclude that MetroCare's declaratory judgment
action is, in fact, a suit against the State for purported contractual reimbursement for which the State has
not waived sovereign immunity. We further conclude that MetroCare has failed to plead and prove the
appropriate requisite intent so as to raise a fact question on whether the State engaged in a "taking" of any
MetroCare-owned property under its eminent domain powers. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. Because
an eminent-domain type of taking by the State has not been shown, the State is not subject to suit under article
I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court erred in denying the State's plea to the jurisdiction.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order denying the State's plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the cause
for lack of jurisdiction.
08-0325
SARAH HORTON (NOW STANNARD) v. CITY OF SMITHVILLE, TEXAS; from Bastrop County; 3rd district
(03-07-00174-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 01-25-08, pet. denied June 2008) (nuisance claim, taking, plea to the
jurisdiction sustained, failure to exhaust of administrative remedies)