jurisdiction-of-county-civil-courts-at-law-in-Harris-County

law-jurisdiction-of-county-civil-court-at-law | $100K AIC ceiling | maximum amount of damages in controversy |
concurrent jurisdiction | district court jurisdiction | JP Court jurisdiction | appeals from justice courts |

COUNTY CIVIL COURTS AT LAW - JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS, LIMITATIONS

Under the Texas Government Code, “a statutory county court exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with the
constitutional jurisdiction of the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in . . . civil cases in
which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000 . . . as alleged on the face of the
petition." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §25.0003 (Vernon Supp. 2009). As alleged in this case, the amount in
controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000. Though the Texas Government Code contains
certain limitations concerning the jurisdiction of a Harris County civil court at law, none of these limitations apply
to the case at hand. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §25.0003(b) (prohibiting jurisdiction of a statutory county court
over causes and proceedings concerning roads, bridges, and public highways); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §25.1032
(a) (Vernon 2004) (prohibiting jurisdiction over probate matters); Therefore, the trial court had subject-matter
jurisdiction over this case. See Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC v. Chatman, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 14-08-00108-
CV, 2009 WL 1660485, at *3. The trial court erred in dismissing this case.
FIA Card Services, NA f/k/a MBNA America Bank, NA v. Horn (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 23, 2009)
(Frost)(suit to confirm arb award under FAA permitted in county court at law, invocation of FAA not
jurisdictionally barred) (federal courts not given exclusive jurisdiction over such actions by Congress)
Decision: TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED:
Opinion by Justice Frost
Panel members: Justices Frost, Brown and Boyce
14-08-00024-CV FIA Card Services, N.A. fka MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Valicia M. Horn
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 1 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jack Cagle

IS INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AVAILABLE IN COUNTY COURT? - IT DEPENDS
Statutory county courts, like constitutional county courts, have the express power to issue writs of injunction.
See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0004(a) (Vernon 2004) ("A statutory county court or its judge may issue writs
of injunction, mandamus, sequestration, attachment, garnishment, certiorari, supersedeas, and all writs
necessary for the enforcement of the jurisdiction of the court.") (emphasis added); see id. § 26.051 (Vernon
2004) (constitutional county courts). Nonetheless, neither type of county court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction unless the court already has jurisdiction over the controversy, either because of the subject matter or
because of the amount in controversy. See Repka v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 542, 186 S.W.2d 977, 980-81
(1945); In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 12 S.W.3d 891, 898 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig.
proceeding).
Statutory county courts (like the trial court here) "ha[ve] jurisdiction over all civil matters and causes, original
and appellate, prescribed by law for county courts...." TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(a) (Vernon 2004);
see also id. § 25.0003(a) (Vernon 2004) ("A statutory county court has jurisdiction over all causes and
proceedings ... prescribed by law for county courts."). County courts, in turn, have jurisdiction "as provided by
law,"[3] which includes, with statutory and constitutional exceptions that are inapplicable here, "concurrent
jurisdiction with the district court in civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not
exceed $5,000, exclusive of interest."[4] Id. § 26.042(d) (Vernon Supp.2007). And statutory county courts at law
having concurrent civil jurisdiction with constitutional county courts also have concurrent jurisdiction with the
district court in "civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000...."
Id. § 25.0003(c)(1) (Vernon Supp.2007).
Appellants' petition reveals that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the requested injunctive relief. First,
no amount in controversy is involved because the suit does not seek damages. Accordingly, no jurisdiction lies
by virtue of the amount-in-controversy jurisdictional provisions for county courts at law. See TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. §§ 25.0003(c)(1), 25.1032(a), 26.042(d); Repka, 186 S.W.2d at 980-81. Second, the petition does not
allege any special matter for which the Legislature has given jurisdiction to constitutional or statutory county
courts. Compare TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon 2004) (establishing jurisdiction over particular
matter in county court at law by providing, "District courts and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction
in eminent domain cases."). In these circumstances, the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the
requested injunction. As the Texas Supreme Court has explained concerning the authority of county courts to
issue injunctive relief:
This general authority, however, is limited to cases where a money demand or its equivalent is involved wherein
the amount in controversy exceeds $200 and does not exceed $1,000, exclusive of interest. In no event does
such authority extend to actions in a court of chancery where the allegations of the petition are not such as to
bring the case within the original jurisdiction of any other court but are sufficient to invoke equitable relief. In
such instances the issuance of the writ is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court under that clause of
the Constitution which provides that the district court "shall have general original jurisdiction over all causes of
action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or this Constitution ..." Vernon's Ann.
St. Const. art. 5, § 8.[[5]]
Repka, 186 S.W.2d at 980-81 (some citations omitted); accord In re Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 12 S.W.
3d at 898 ("In summary, ... when a county court already has jurisdiction over a controversy, either by the subject
matter or amount in controversy, it has exclusive power to dispose of the controversy; this power includes the
issuance of injunctions that are related to the controversy.").
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing appellants' request for injunctive relief.
Medina v. Benkiser (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2009)(Hanks)(plenary jurisdiction)
(trial court did not have authority to modify judgment after appeal and add an award attorney's fees; prior
appeal was not interlocutory, modified judgment found void)
Our opinion and judgment in Medina I constituted the final resolution of the controversy between the parties, and the trial court
lacked plenary power to award attorney's fees to appellees. By affirming the trial court's judgment, our judgment essentially
adopted the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Because the trial court did not award attorney's
fees to the appellees in its judgment--and the appellees did not raise this failure to award fees as an issue in Medina I--our
opinion and judgment in Medina I closed the door on the possibility of the appellees recovering their attorney's fees in this case.
We sustain appellants' first issue and hold that the trial court lacked plenary power to modify the judgment and award appellees'
attorney's fees.
VACATE TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT AND DISMISS CASE: Opinion by Justice Hanks
Before Justices Keyes, Alcala and Hanks
01-08-00777-CV Debra Medina, Mallory Miller, Jr., Dustan Costine, Chad Creighton, Richard Wyatt and Kay
Fisher v. Tina Benkiser and The Republican Party of Texas
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 4 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Roberta A. Lloyd

CAN AN AMENDED PETITION DEPRIVE THE COUNTY COURT OF JURISDICTION BASED
ON DAMAGES SOUGHT IN EXCESS OF $100,000?

We begin with the Cantus' third issue because it challenges the trial court's jurisdiction. Subject-matter
jurisdiction is essential to a court's jurisdiction and and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law we review de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004). In this issue, the Cantus contend that when they filed an amended petition alleging damages in excess
of the jurisdictional limit of the county court at law, the trial court lost jurisdiction over their case and so erred in
failing to transfer it to a district court. The record reflects that the Cantus filed a motion to transfer on this basis
but no ruling appears in the record. The Cantus assert that the trial court refused to rule on their motion.

Initially, we note that the appellate record does not include as a filing the amended petition on which the Cantus
base their jurisdictional complaint. The purported petition, which the Cantus refer to as “Plaintiff and Involuntary
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition and Request for Disclosure," appears in the record only as an exhibit to the
Cantus' motion for reconsideration of the trial court's determination that the Cantus were vexatious litigants. But
Dominguez does not dispute that this petition was filed in the trial court, so we will presume this petition was filed
and address the Cantus' argument accordingly. This petition bears a file stamp purporting to show that it was
filed on December 7, 2007; we will therefore refer to it as the “December 2007 petition."

As is relevant here, the trial court, the County Civil Court at Law No. 4 of Harris County (“Court No. 4"), has
jurisdiction over civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000 “as
alleged on the face of the petition." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 25.0003(c)(1), 25.1032(a) (Vernon Supp.
2009). The amount in controversy is ordinarily determined by looking at the allegations in the plaintiff's original
petition. See Peek v. Equip. Svc. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989); Isbell v. Kenyon-
Warner Dredging Co., 113 Tex. 528, 261 S.W. 762, 763 (1924); Williams v. Le Garage De La Paix, Inc., 562 S.
W. 2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We must presume jurisdiction unless
the lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the petition. Peek, 779 S.W.2d at 804. As a general
rule, when jurisdiction is once lawfully and properly acquired, no later fact or event can defeat the court's
jurisdiction. Isbell, 261 S.W. at 763. Further, the fact that an amended petition alleges damages in excess of
the jurisdictional limits of the county court does not deprive that court of the jurisdiction it properly acquired
when the original petition was filed. Id. at 763.

The earliest petition in the appellate record is designated as “Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition and Request
for Disclosure" and was filed on October 25, 2007 (the “October 2007 petition"). In the October 2007 petition,
Tony Cantu affirmatively states that “[t]his Court has jurisdiction over the claims and parties, and the amounts in
controversy are with the Court's jurisdiction limits." Further, a review of the prayer shows that Tony Cantu
sought money damages totaling $61,900, plus various types of damages for which no amount is specified.
Based on Cantu's representation that the amount in controversy was within the court's jurisdictional limit, and his
prayer for damages that does not affirmatively exceed $100,000, we conclude that the trial court properly
acquired jurisdiction over the case. See Isbell, 261 S.W. at 763; Williams, 562 S.W.2d at 535.

In their brief, the Cantus argue that the trial court lost jurisdiction when the December 2007 petition was filed
because this petition shows that the money damages sought “plus the exemplary damages" exceed the trial
court's jurisdiction.[1] The Cantus do not point to any specific portion of the petition or cite any to authority
other than a general reference to Government Code section 25.003. A review of the December 2007 petition
reveals that Elsa Cantu was named as a plaintiff, and the Cantus asserted the same claims made in the October
2007 petition as well as several new claims. The Cantus also sought specified money damages totaling
$96,900 - within the trial court's jurisdiction - plus unspecified amounts for other alleged damages.[2] Although
the Cantus argue that we should consider the exemplary damages sought, exemplary damages are not
considered for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0003(c)(1)
(providing that interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and costs are excluded
from the determination of the amount in controversy); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(5)
(Vernon 2008) (exemplary damages include punitive damages).

Additionally, in the December 2007 petition the Cantus again affirmatively represent that the trial court had
jurisdiction over the claims and parties, and that the amounts in controversy were within the court's jurisdictional
limits. And the Cantus repeated this assertion two additional times in their first and second amended responses
to Dominguez's motion to have them declared vexatious litigants, both of which were filed after the December
2007 petition was filed. Arguably, then, based on the allegations of the petition, the money damages specifically
requested, and the Cantu's own repeated representations, the damages sought remained within the trial court's
jurisdiction. But even assuming the Cantus sought damages in excess of the trial court's jurisdictional limit in the
December 2007 petition, the filing of the December 2007 petition did not cause the trial court to lose the
jurisdiction it originally acquired. See Isbell, 261 S.W. at 763-64; Williams, 562 S.W.2d at 536; see also Cook v.
Jaynes, 366 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no pet.). Therefore, we overrule the Cantus' third
issue.
Cantu v. Dominguez (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist] Sep. 10, 2009)(Brown)
(v e x lit no security posted, lawsuit against attorney, jurisdictional limits of county court)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Brown
Before Justices Seymore, Brown and Sullivan
14-08-00156-CV Tony Cantu and Elsa Cantu v. Ben Dominguez
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 4 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Roberta Anne Lloyd

The record reflects that the county court made no determination as to Ryals's authority to administer the Trust.
Further, a county court has no jurisdiction to construe a trust agreement. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001
(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (A district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
proceedings by or against a trustee and all proceedings concerning trusts, including
proceedings to construe a trust instrument.). Therefore, Ryals's res judicata and collateral estoppel
arguments fail because the issue of whether Ryals has authority to manage the Trust was not fully and fairly
litigated in the previous suit, nor could it have been raised in the county court.
Ryals v. Ogden (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 25, 2009) (Boyce)
(temporary injunction appeal, multiple proceedings in different courts, unclean hands doctrine inapplicable, res
judicata does not apply, other court did not have jurisdiction, collateral attack on prior judgment).
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Boyce
Before Justices Anderson, Frost and Boyce
14-07-01008-CV Kenneth Ryals, Managing Trustee of East Texas Investment Trust v. Lisa Ogden, Steven
Gayle and Wayne Westbrook
Appeal from 55th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Ju dge (now Justice) Jeffrey V. Brown

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