law-employment-at-will
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE IN TEXAS - APPELLATE CASE LAW
absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the
employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all
As to Guerra's breach of contract claim, Wal-Mart and Garza challenge the jury's finding of an oral employment agreement that
modified Guerra's at-will employment status. Specifically, Wal-Mart and Garza argue Guerra did not establish the existence of an
employment contract because (1) the oral statements made to Guerra did not, as a matter of law, unequivocally indicate a definite
intent by Wal-Mart to modify Guerra's at-will employment status; (2) there was no evidence that any of the Wal-Mart officers who
made the oral statements to Guerra had authority to bind Wal-Mart to a contract for lifetime employment; (3) any such oral agreement
was barred by the statute of frauds; and (4) any such oral agreement was unenforceable because it was supported by insufficient
consideration. Alternatively, Wal-Mart and Garza argue that even if Guerra established the existence of an employment contract,
Wal-Mart was justified in breaching the contract because the record contains conclusive evidence that it had good cause to demote
or terminate Guerra.
The general rule in Texas, and in most states, is that absent a specific agreement to the
contrary, employment may be terminated by the employer or the employee at will, for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502
(Tex. 1998) (holding an employer's oral statements did not modify an employee's at-will status absent a definite,
stated intention to the contrary). Such at-will employment, however, may become contractual based on oral
statements of those in authority. Gilmartin v. Corpus Christi Broad. Co., 985 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Tex. App.--San
Antonio 1998, no pet.).
For such a contract to exist, the employer must unequivocally indicate a definite intent to
be bound not to terminate the employee except under clearly specified circumstances.
Midland Judicial Dist. Cmty. Supervision and Corr. Dept. v. Jones, 92 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Tex. 2002); Montgomery
County, 965 S.W.2d at 502. To determine if particular oral statements manifest the required intent, courts
consider both the context in which the statements were made and the language employed. See El Expreso, Inc. v.
Zendejas, 193 S.W.3d 590, 597 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that in the context of the
entire case, supervisor's statements that employee would not be fired for attempting to make the company comply
with applicable safety regulations were legally and factually sufficient to modify the employee's at-will status);
Miksch v. Exxon, Corp., 979 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (noting that
employer's statement to employee did not contain ambiguous terminology or require speculation about the
parameters of the parties' alleged agreement, and therefore, the employer's statement was not, as a matter of law,
insufficient to modify the employee's at-will status).
General comments that an employee will not be discharged as long as his work is
satisfactory do not in themselves manifest an intent to modify an employee's at-will status.
Montgomery County, 965 S.W.2d at 502. Similarly, statements that an employee will be discharged only for "good
reason" or "good cause" do not manifest such an intent when there is no agreement on what those terms
encompass. Id. An employee who has no formal agreement with his employer cannot construct one out of
indefinite comments, encouragements, or assurances. Id. Without such an agreement, the employee cannot
reasonably expect to limit the employer's right to terminate him. Id. As the supreme court recognized in
Montgomery County,
Courts "must distinguish between carefully developed employer representations upon which an employee may
justifiably rely, and general platitudes, vague assurances, praise, and indefinite promises of permanent continued
employment." Only when the promises are definite and, thus, of the sort which may be reasonably or justifiably
relied on by the employee, will a contract claim be viable, not when the employee relies on only vague assurances
that no reasonable person would justifiably rely upon. There is, thus, an objective component to the nature of
such a contract claim in the form of definite and specific promises by the employer sufficient to substantively
restrict the reasons for termination. Id. at 503 (quoting Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. 1995)
(citations omitted)).
09-0674
JOHN CLYDE GUERRA v. WAL-MART STORES, INC. AND ED GARZA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT FOR
WAL-MART; from Starr County;
4th district (04-08-00146-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07-01-09, pet. denied Oct 2009)(employment dispute, at will
employment, no employment contract - no breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fails
on appeal)
In sum, the statements made by Tippens, Moore, and Williams require speculation about the most fundamental
terms of the purported agreement. Consequently, the statements fail to show Tippens, Moore, and Williams
unequivocally indicated a definite intent to be bound not to terminate Guerra. After analyzing the statements made
by Tippens, Moore, and Williams, we conclude they did not modify the employee's at-will employment to a specific
contractual arrangement. See Montgomery County, 965 S.W.2d at 501-503 (holding oral assurances to employee
that she would not be fired as long as she was doing her job and she would not be fired unless there was good
cause were too indefinite to constitute an agreement limiting the employer's right to discharge the employee);
Runge v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. App.--Waco 2001, no pet.) (holding supervisor's
comments that employee had an "opportunity of a lifetime" and a "job for life" were not specific enough to alter the
at-will employment relationship). Accordingly, the statements made by Tippens, Moore, and Williams fail to
comprise more than a mere scintilla of evidence of an employment contract
09-0332
SYBLE HOOD v. EDWARD D. JONES & CO., L.P. AND ROBBY R. ROGERS; from Andrews County; 8th district
(08-07-00093-CV, 277 SW3d 498, 01-29-09, pet denied)(tortious interference, at will employment, age
discrimination suit)
Texas strictly follows the employment-at-will doctrine. Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501,
502 (Tex. 1998); East Line & Red River Ry. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). "For well over a
century, the general rule in this State, as in most American jurisdictions, has been that
absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the
employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all." Montgomery
County Hosp. Dist., 965 S.W.2d at 502. Both Rogers and Steve Rarick, Senior Human Resources Generalist at
the home office in Missouri, testified by affidavit that Hood was an at-will-employee and had no employment
contract. Thus, Hood was subject to discharge for any reason unless prohibited by Texas or federal law.
08-0267
DWIGHT HINES AND SHANNON EVERETT v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION; from Harris County; 14th district
(14-06-00745-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 02-26-08, pet. denied May 2008)(employment law, defamation, age
discrimination, employment at will doctrine) (Justice O'Neill not sitting)