Adverse Employment Action
To establish an adverse personnel action, a plaintiff must show that:
…a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have
‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L. Ed.
2d 345 (2006); see Montgomery County v. Park, 246 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. 2007) (“for a
personnel action to be adverse within the meaning of the [Texas Whistleblower] Act, it must be
material, and thus likely to deter a reasonable, similarly situated employee from reporting a
violation of the law”); see also Niu v. Revcor Molded Prods. Co., 206 S.W.3d 723, 730-32 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (applying BNSF to retaliation claim under § 21.055 of the
Labor Code). “[T]ermination is clearly an adverse employment action,  even under the new
standard articulated in Burlington Northern.” Dehart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.,
214 Fed. Appx. 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing BNSF, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S. Ct. at 2415).
Thus, we must determine whether a causal nexus exists between the protected activity and
08‑0664 LIMESTONE COUNTY, TEXAS v. LAURI J. ANDERSON; from Limestone County; 10th district
(10-07-00174-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07‑02‑08)(employment law, termination of employment, sex discrimination,
retaliation claim, adverse employment action, causal nexus, filing deadline for administrative complaint under
Texas Labor Code, exhaustion of administrative remedies)