law-estoppel | judicial estoppel | equitable estoppel | promissory estoppel | collateral estoppel and
res judicata |
estoppel as affirmative defense |
TEXAS SUPREME COURT DECISION INVOLVING ESTOPPEL CLAIMS
Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Association, No. 06-0247 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Johnson)
(insurance coverage, waiver, estoppel)
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Neill joined.
Estoppel, on the other hand, generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s
detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit. See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v.
Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable
estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with
knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4)
to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally
relies on the representations.”); Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex.
1997) (“Promissory estoppel generally is a defensive doctrine in that it estops a promisor from
denying the enforceability of [a] promise.”).
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, No. 05-0916 (Tex. June 27, 2008) (Majority Opinion
by Justice Medina) (religion-based immunity to tort claim, estoppel claim rejected, defendants not
estopped from invoking first amendment protection based on prior litigation conduct incl. mandamus
proceeding, religion church and state case)
PLEASANT GLADE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, REVEREND LLOYD A. MCCUTCHEN, ROD LINZAY,
HOLLY LINZAY, SANDRA SMITH, BECKY BICKEL, AND PAUL PATTERSON v. LAURA SCHUBERT;
from Tarrant County; 2nd district (02-02-00264-CV, 174 SW3d 388, 09-15-05)
3 petitions | motion to strike denied
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the case.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, Justice
Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice Willett joined.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green joined, and in Parts II-
A, III, and IV of which Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Green delivered a dissenting opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion
APPEALS COURT CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT DENIED
09-0060 ESTATE OF BRANCH ARCHER, BY RICHARD K. ARCHER AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND RICHARD K. ARCHER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE
RICHARD K. ARCHER, M.D., P.A. PROFIT SHARING PLAN & TRUST v. RICHARD O. HARRIS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE RICHARD O. HARRIS PROFIT SHARING TRUST; from
Wichita County; 2nd district (02-07-00243-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-04-08)(Justice Johnson not sitting)
(partnership dispute, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel)
This is a partnership dispute. In six issues, Appellant Richard K. Archer (Archer) complains of a
summary judgment in favor of Appellee Richard O. Harris, Individually and as Trustee of the Richard
O. Harris Profit Sharing Trust (Harris) on Archer's claims for breach of covenant against
encumbrances and for money had and received. We affirm.
Collateral estoppel applies when three elements are present: (1) the facts sought to be litigated
in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were
essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were in an adversarial
posture in the first action. The doctrine is designed to promote judicial efficiency and to prevent
inconsistent judgments by preventing re-litigation of an ultimate issue of fact. When the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the
prior suit, that party may not re-litigate the issue.
Judicial estoppel bars a party who has made a sworn statement in a pleading, a deposition, oral
testimony, or affidavit in a judicial proceeding from maintaining a contrary position in a subsequent
proceeding. The elements of judicial estoppel are (1) a sworn, inconsistent statement made
in a previous judicial proceeding; (2) the party who made the statement successfully
maintained the previous position; (3) the previous statement was not made inadvertently or
by mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
Archer argues that Harris is precluded from relying on the Mutual Release to defeat his claims
because Harris prevailed in the Randall County suit in part because Harris asserted that the Mutual
Release was invalid and because the validity of the Mutual Release was fully and fairly litigated in
the prior action, culminating in a determination that the release was invalid. Harris responds that
he did not challenge the validity of the Mutual Release in the Randall County suit and that nothing in
that suit estops Harris from relying on the Mutual Release in defense against Archer's claims in this
action. We agree with Harris.
BIOSILK SPA, L.P., F.K.A. ONE MARENGO, L.P. v. HG SHOPPING CENTERS, L.P.; from Harris
County; 14th district (14-06-00986-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 05-08-08) (fraud, fraudulent inducement,
negligent misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel, no reasonable reliance)