law-estoppel | judicial estoppel | equitable estoppel | promissory estoppel | collateral estoppel and res judicata |
estoppel as affirmative defense |
TEXAS SUPREME COURT DECISION INVOLVING ESTOPPEL CLAIMS
Ulico Casualty Co. v. Allied Pilots Association, No. 06-0247 (Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)(Johnson)
(insurance coverage, waiver, estoppel)
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Neill joined.
Estoppel, on the other hand, generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or
to the misleading party’s own benefit. See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.
W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or
concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the
intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the
facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.”); Trammell Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.
2d 631, 636 (Tex. 1997) (“Promissory estoppel generally is a defensive doctrine in that it estops a promisor
from denying the enforceability of [a] promise.”).
Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, No. 05-0916 (Tex. June 27, 2008) (Majority Opinion by Justice
Medina) (religion-based immunity to tort claim, estoppel claim rejected, defendants not estopped from invoking
first amendment protection based on prior litigation conduct incl. mandamus proceeding, religion church and
state case)
PLEASANT GLADE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, REVEREND LLOYD A. MCCUTCHEN, ROD LINZAY, HOLLY LINZAY,
SANDRA SMITH, BECKY BICKEL, AND PAUL PATTERSON v. LAURA SCHUBERT; from Tarrant County; 2nd
district (02-02-00264-CV, 174 SW3d 388, 09-15-05)
3 petitions | motion to strike denied
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment and dismisses the case.
Justice Medina delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Brister, and Justice Willett joined.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green joined, and in Parts II-A, III, and IV
of which Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Green delivered a dissenting opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion
APPEALS COURT CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT DENIED REVIEW
09-0060 ESTATE OF BRANCH ARCHER, BY RICHARD K. ARCHER AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND
RICHARD K. ARCHER, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE RICHARD K. ARCHER, M.D., P.A. PROFIT
SHARING PLAN & TRUST v. RICHARD O. HARRIS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE RICHARD O.
HARRIS PROFIT SHARING TRUST; from Wichita County; 2nd district (02-07-00243-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 12-04-
08)(Justice Johnson not sitting)(partnership dispute, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel)
This is a partnership dispute. In six issues, Appellant Richard K. Archer (Archer)[2] complains of a summary
judgment in favor of Appellee Richard O. Harris, Individually and as Trustee of the Richard O. Harris Profit
Sharing Trust (Harris) on Archer's claims for breach of covenant against encumbrances and for money had
and received. We affirm.
Collateral estoppel applies when three elements are present: (1) the facts sought to be litigated in the
second action were fully and fairly litigated in the first action; (2) those facts were essential to the
judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were in an adversarial posture in the first action. The
doctrine is designed to promote judicial efficiency and to prevent inconsistent judgments by preventing
re-litigation of an ultimate issue of fact.[16] When the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit, that party may not re-litigate the issue.
Judicial estoppel bars a party who has made a sworn statement in a pleading, a deposition, oral testimony,
or affidavit in a judicial proceeding from maintaining a contrary position in a subsequent proceeding.[18] The
elements of judicial estoppel are (1) a sworn, inconsistent statement made in a previous judicial
proceeding; (2) the party who made the statement successfully maintained the previous position; (3)
the previous statement was not made inadvertently or by mistake, fraud, or duress; and (4) the
statement was deliberate, clear, and unequivocal.
Archer argues that Harris is precluded from relying on the Mutual Release to defeat his claims because Harris
prevailed in the Randall County suit in part because Harris asserted that the Mutual Release was invalid and
because the validity of the Mutual Release was fully and fairly litigated in the prior action, culminating in a
determination that the release was invalid. Harris responds that he did not challenge the validity of the Mutual
Release in the Randall County suit and that nothing in that suit estops Harris from relying on the Mutual
Release in defense against Archer's claims in this action. We agree with Harris.
08-0510
BIOSILK SPA, L.P., F.K.A. ONE MARENGO, L.P. v. HG SHOPPING CENTERS, L.P.; from Harris County; 14th
district (14-06-00986-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 05-08-08) (fraud, fraudulent inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel, no reasonable reliance)