Prodigy Communications Corp. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance,
No. 06-0598 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009)(Jefferson)(insurance coverage dispute, effect of non-compliance with
notice requirement)(Court concludes that "“notice as soon as practicable” was not an essential part of the
bargained-for exchange under the claims-made policy at issue here." Following PAJ, the Court holds that,
"in the absence of prejudice to the insurer, the insured’s alleged failure to comply with the provision does
not defeat coverage."
In a claims-made policy, when an insured notifies its insurer of a claim within the
policy term or other reporting period that the policy specifies, the insured’s failure to
provide notice “as soon as practicable” will not defeat coverage in the absence of
prejudice to the insurer. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment,
render judgment that AESIC cannot deny coverage because of Prodigy’s alleged
failure to give notice “as soon as practicable,” and remand the remaining issues to
the trial court.
PRODIGY COMMUNICATIONS CORP. v. AGRICULTURAL EXCESS & SURPLUS INSURANCE
COMPANY, N/K/A GREAT AMERICAN E & S INSURANCE COMPANY AND GREAT AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-05-00442-CV, 195 SW3d 764, 05-30-06)
The Court reverses the court of appeals' judgment, renders judgment in part, and remands the case to
the trial court.
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright,
Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Green joined.
Justice Wainwright delivered a concurring opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Hecht and Justice Willett joined.
Prodigy Comm. Corp. v. Agricultural Excess & Surplus Ins. (Tex. 2009)
Argued April 1, 2008
Chief Justice Jefferson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice O’Neill, Justice
Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Medina, and Justice Green.
Justice Wainwright delivered a concurring opinion.
Justice Johnson delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Hecht and Justice Willett.
In PAJ, Inc. v. The Hanover Insurance Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008), we held that “an
insured’s failure to timely notify its insurer of a claim or suit does not defeat coverage if the insurer
was not prejudiced by the delay.” PAJ involved an occurrence-based commercial general liability
(“CGL”) policy with a prompt-notice provision that required the insured to notify the insurer of “an
occurrence or an offense that may result in a claim ‘as soon as practicable.’” Id. at 631-32. Noting
that “the timely notice provision was not an essential part of the bargained-for exchange under
PAJ’s occurrence-based policy,” we held that PAJ’s untimely notice did not defeat coverage in the
absence of prejudice to the insurer. Id. at 636-37.
Today, we decide whether PAJ’s notice-prejudice rule applies to a claims-made policy when the
notice provision requires that the insured, “as a condition precedent” to its rights under the policy,
give notice of a claim to its insurer “as soon as practicable . . ., but in no event later than ninety
(90) days after the expiration of the Policy Period or Discovery Period.”
The parties dispute whether notice of the claim was given “as soon as practicable” but agree that
the insured gave notice within the ninety-day cutoff period. The insurer also admits that it was not
prejudiced by the delayed notice.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that “notice as soon as practicable” was not an
essential part of the bargained-for exchange under the claims-made policy at issue here.
Following PAJ, we hold that, in the absence of prejudice to the insurer, the insured’s alleged
failure to comply with the provision does not defeat coverage. See id. Because the court of
appeals held otherwise, 195 S.W.3d 764, 768, we reverse its judgment, render judgment that the
insurer may not deny coverage based on the fact that notice was not given “as soon as
practicable,” and remand the remaining issues to the trial court.
I Factual Background
Prodigy Communications merged with FlashNet Communications in May 2000. At the time of the
merger, FlashNet was insured under a claims-made “Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance
Policy Including Company Reimbursement” issued by Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance
Company (AESIC). In exchange for a $19,519 premium, the policy covered losses resulting
from certain “claims first made” against FlashNet and its directors and officers during the policy
period of March 16, 2000 to May 31, 2000. In anticipation of its merger with Prodigy, FlashNet
purchased a 3-year “Discovery Period” which, in exchange for a $93,750 premium, extended
coverage under the policy to any “claims first made” against the Insureds between May 31, 2000
and May 31, 2003.
The policy contained the following amended “notice of claim” provision:
The [Insureds] shall, as a condition precedent to their rights under this Policy, give the Insurer
notice, in writing, as soon as practicable of any Claim first made against the [Insureds] during the
Policy Period, or Discovery Period (if applicable), but in no event later than ninety (90) days after
the expiration of the Policy Period, or Discovery Period, and shall give the Insurer such information
and cooperation as it may reasonably require.
On November 28, 2001, FlashNet was named as a defendant in a class-action securities lawsuit
(commonly referred to as the “IPO litigation”). The underlying FlashNet lawsuit constituted a
“Securities Claim first made against [FlashNet]” “during the . . . Discovery Period” of the policy, as
described in the insuring agreement added by Policy Endorsement 16. Prodigy was served with a
copy of the complaint on June 20, 2002 and first notified AESIC of the FlashNet lawsuit in a letter
dated June 6, 2003. Apparently assuming that AESIC was already aware of the underlying lawsuit,
the June 6 letter requested AESIC’s consent to a proposed settlement agreement of the claims
brought against FlashNet, rather than purporting to provide the initial notice of the claim.
By letter dated June 18, 2003, AESIC denied coverage on the ground that the June 6 letter did not
comply with the policy’s notice requirements. In response, Prodigy provided AESIC with formal
written notice of the claim on June 26, 2003. Along with this notice, Prodigy attached a letter
asserting that notice was timely because it had been sent within ninety days of the expiration of the
Discovery Period. Despite Prodigy’s efforts, AESIC never retreated from its no coverage stance.
II Procedural Background
Prodigy sued AESIC, seeking a declaration that Prodigy was contractually entitled to coverage.
Prodigy also asserted several extra-contractual claims alleging, among other things, that AESIC
violated certain Insurance Code provisions as an unauthorized surplus lines insurer and was thus
liable to Prodigy for the full amount of coverage. AESIC moved for summary judgment arguing that
Prodigy did not satisfy the policy’s condition precedent that notice of a claim be given “as soon as
practicable.” Prodigy filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Prodigy's
motion and granted AESIC's motion in part, ruling that Prodigy failed to comply with the condition
precedent of timely notice and that this failure “avoids coverage, with or without prejudice to
AESIC.” AESIC and Great American Insurance Company then moved for summary judgment on
the remaining Insurance Code issues, and the trial court granted a final summary judgment in their
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that: (1) Prodigy was required to give notice “as soon as
practicable,” even though the policy allowed notice within ninety days after the expiration of the
discovery period; (2) notice given almost one year after the filing of the lawsuit against the insured
was not “as soon as practicable” as a matter of law; (3) AESIC was not required to prove that it
was prejudiced by Prodigy’s late notice; and (4) Insurance Code provisions did not prevent AESIC
from enforcing the policy’s notice provision. 195 S.W.3d 764, 766-69. Prodigy petitioned this
court for review on the issues of late notice and Insurance Code violations. We granted the
petition. 51 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 292 (Jan. 14, 2008).
We must decide whether, under a claims-made policy, an insurer can deny coverage based on its
insured’s alleged failure to comply with a policy provision requiring that notice of a claim be given
“as soon as practicable,” when (1) notice of the claim was provided before the reporting deadline
specified in the policy; and (2) the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay.
As noted earlier, we recently held in PAJ that an “insured’s failure to timely notify its insurer of a
claim or suit does not defeat coverage if the insurer was not prejudiced by the delay.” 243 S.W.3d
at 636-37. In reaching that conclusion, we followed our holding in Hernandez that “an immaterial
breach does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus cannot relieve the
insurer of the contractual coverage obligation.” PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 631 (citing Hernandez v. Gulf
Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994)). Prodigy argues that, even assuming it
breached the policy’s requirement that notice of a claim must be given “as soon as practicable,”
under our holding in PAJ, that breach was immaterial and cannot defeat coverage given AESIC’s
admitted lack of prejudice. See id. AESIC responds that our holding in PAJ does not control the
outcome of this case for several reasons.
First, unlike the PAJ policy, this one states unambiguously that the insured’s duty to give “notice, in
writing, as soon as practicable” is a “condition precedent” to coverage. Importantly however, our
holding in PAJ did not rest on the distinction between conditions and covenants. See id. at 633
(noting that in Hernandez “[w]ithout distinguishing between covenants and conditions or classifying
the exclusion as one or the other, we concluded that the insured's breach of the settlement-without-
consent provision was immaterial and thus the insurer could not avoid liability”) (citing Hernandez,
875 S.W.2d at 693); see also id. at 633 n.2 (noting that “the courts in many of the cases we cited
made no attempt to classify the policy provisions as either covenants or conditions, nor did they
even employ those terms”). Instead, we followed our reasoning in Hernandez, where we applied
“‘fundamental principle[s] of contract law,’” to hold “that when one party to a contract commits a
material breach, the other party's performance is excused.” Id. at 633 (quoting Hernandez, 875 S.
W.2d at 692). We noted that one consideration in determining the materiality of a breach is “‘the
extent to which the nonbreaching party will be deprived of the benefit that it could have reasonably
anticipated from full performance.’” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 693 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(a) (1981))). Thus, while the Prodigy policy describes
the notice provision as a “condition precedent,” we must go further to determine whether prejudice
is, or is not, required.
This brings us to AESIC’s second reason for distinguishing this case from PAJ. Unlike the
occurrence-based policy in PAJ, the policy at issue here is a “claims-made” policy. According to
AESIC, timely notice is always inherent to, and an essential part of, the bargained-for exchange in
a claims-made policy. In PAJ, we recognized a “critical distinction” between the role of notice in
claims-made policies and the role of notice in occurrence policies and concluded that timely
notice was not an essential part of the bargained-for exchange in PAJ’s occurrence-based policy.
243 S.W.3d at 636. In reaching this conclusion, we were persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s
explanation that “‘[i]n the case of an “occurrence” policy, any notice requirement is subsidiary to
the event that triggers coverage.’” Id. (quoting Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653, 658 (5th Cir. 1999)).
To determine whether “notice as soon as practicable” is an essential part of the bargained-for
exchange in the claims-made policy at issue here, it is helpful to review the basic distinctions
between occurrence and claims-made policies and the different types of notice requirements
associated with each.
As one treatise explains:
D&O insurance policies today are invariably written on a “claims-made” basis, which means that
the policy only covers those claims first asserted against the insured during the policy period. This
limitation appears in the insuring clauses. This coverage differs from “occurrence” type coverage,
written for most casualty insurance, which covers only claims arising out of occurrences happening
within the policy period, regardless of when the claim is made.
3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 12A.05 (2006). Thus, the main difference
between these two types of policies is that a “claims-made” policy provides unlimited retroactive
coverage and no prospective coverage, while an “occurrence” policy provides unlimited
prospective coverage and no retroactive coverage. 20 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmes’ Appleman on
Insurance § 130.1(A)(1) (2d ed. 2002) (“Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 2D”); see also 1 Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 1.5 (3d ed. 2008) (“Couch on Insurance 3D”).
For the insurance company, the primary advantage of a claims-made policy “is the limitation of
liability to claims asserted during the policy period.” 20 Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 2D §
130.1(A)(1). This allows insurers “to calculate risks and premiums with greater precision.” Id.
Furthermore, “the elimination of exposure to claims filed after the policy expiration date enables
liability insurance companies to issue the claims made policies at reduced premiums.” Id.
Both occurrence policies and claims-made policies tend to have a requirement that notice of a
claim be given to the insurer promptly, or “as soon as practicable.” See 13 Couch on Insurance 3D
§ 186:13; see also Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Mass.
1990). Unlike occurrence policies, however, some claims-made policies (often called “claims-
made-and-reported policies) have an additional requirement that the claim be reported to the
insurer within the policy period or within a specific number of days thereafter. See, e.g., Burns v.
Int’l Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1991) (claims to be reported within sixty days following
policy termination); Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 396-97 (N.J. 1985)
(claims to be made against insured and reported to insurer during policy period).
As courts and commentators have recognized, the different kinds of notice requirements when
found in a claims-made policy serve very different purposes. See, e.g., 13 Couch on Insurance
3D § 186:13 (“As a general statement, the prompt notice of claim requirement and the ‘claims
made’ within the policy period requirement serve such different purposes, and are of such different
basic character, that the principles applied to one should have little or nothing to do with the
principles applied to the other.”); Chas. T. Main, 551 N.E.2d at 29 (noting that “[t]he purposes of
the two types of reporting requirements differ sharply”).
In a claims-made policy, the requirement that notice be given to the insurer “as soon as
practicable” serves to “maximiz[e] the insurer's opportunity to investigate, set reserves, and control
or participate in negotiations with the third party asserting the claim against the insured.” 13
Couch on Insurance 3D § 186:13, see also Chas. T. Main, 551 N.E.2d at 29. By contrast, the
requirement that the claim be made during the policy period “is directed to the temporal
boundaries of the policy's basic coverage terms . . . . [This type of notice] is not simply part of the
insured's duty to cooperate, but defines the limits of the insurer's obligation, and if there is no
timely notice, there is no coverage.” 13 Couch on Insurance 3D § 186:13. Similarly, a notice
provision requiring that a claim be reported to the insurer during the policy period or within a
specific number of days thereafter “define[s] the scope of coverage by providing a certain date
after which an insurer knows it is no longer liable under the policy.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ayo,
31 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Chas. T. Main, 551 N.E.2d at 29-30 (noting that
“fairness in rate setting is the purpose of a requirement that notice of a claim be given within the
policy period or shortly thereafter” and therefore this type of notice requirement “is of the essence
in determining whether coverage exists” in a claims-made policy).
The role of notice in claims-made policies has been described as follows:
Claims made or discovery policies are essentially reporting policies. If the claim is reported to the
insurer during the policy period, then the carrier is legally obligated to pay; if the claim is not
reported during the policy period, no liability attaches. Claims made policies require notification to
the insurer to be within a reasonable time. Critically, however, claims made policies require that
that notice be given during the policy period itself.
20 Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 2D § 130.1(A)1 (emphasis added). Because the requirement
that a claim be reported to the insurer during the policy period or within a specific number of days
thereafter is considered essential to coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy, most
courts have found that an insurer need not demonstrate prejudice to deny coverage when an
insured does not give notice of a claim within the policy’s specified time frame.
In Main, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted the distinction between the “as soon
as practicable” and “within the policy year” notice requirements and concluded that, in a claims-
made policy, noncompliance with the latter would defeat coverage regardless of prejudice to the
insured. 551 N.E.2d at 30. The court explained:
The purpose of a claims-made policy is to minimize the time between the insured event and the
payment. For that reason, the insured event is the claim being made against the insured during the
policy period and the claim being reported to the insurer within that same period or a slightly
extended, and specified, period. If a claim is made against an insured, but the insurer does not
know about it until years later, the primary purpose of insuring claims rather than occurrences is
frustrated. Accordingly, the requirement that notice of the claim be given in the policy period or
shortly thereafter in the claims-made policy is of the essence in determining whether coverage
exists. Prejudice for an untimely report in this instance is not an appropriate inquiry.
Id. The court then concluded that a statutory notice-prejudice requirement “applies only to the ‘as
soon as practicable’ type of notice and not to the ‘within the policy year’ type of reporting
requirement which is contained in the policy under review in this case and was not met.” Id.
Similarly, in T.H.E. Insurance Company v. P.T.P. Inc., 628 A.2d 223, 228 (Md. 1993), the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a statutory notice-prejudice requirement did not apply to the insurer’s
denial of coverage under a claims-made policy for a claim made and reported after the policy had
expired. The court emphasized that the insurer was not attempting to “deny coverage because of
an alleged material failure to perform a covenant to give notice, or to satisfy a policy provision that
might be phrased as a condition that must be satisfied to prevent the loss of coverage that
otherwise would apply.” T.H.E. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d at 227. Rather, the court explained, the extended
reporting period under the policy had expired before P.T.P. reported the claim, and therefore the
notice-prejudice requirement “could no more revive the original policy to cover [the claim] than [it]
could reopen an occurrence policy to embrace a claim based on an accident that happened after
the end of the policy period.” Id. The court observed that the insurer would be required to
demonstrate prejudice, however, to deny coverage based on the policy’s provision requiring the
insured to give notice of a claim “‘as soon as practicable,’” assuming that the claim had been
made and reported within the extended reporting period. Id. at 227 n.7.
We agree with this analysis. In a claims-made policy, when an insured gives notice of a claim
within the policy period or other specified reporting period, the insurer must show that the insured’
s noncompliance with the policy’s “as soon as practicable” notice provision prejudiced the insurer
before it may deny coverage. Here, it is undisputed that Prodigy gave notice of the FlashNet
lawsuit before the ninety-day cutoff. Even assuming that Prodigy did not give notice “as soon as
practicable,” AESIC was not denied the benefit of the claims-made nature of its policy as it could
not “close its books” on the policy until ninety days after the discovery period expired. See F.D.I.C.
v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the notice requirements in claims made
policies allow the insurer to ‘close its books’ on a policy at its expiration and thus to ‘attain a level
of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies’”)(quoting Burns v. Int’l Ins. Co.,
709 F. Supp. 187, 191 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir.1991)); see also 20
Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 2D § 130.1(A)1 (“The essence . . . of a claims made policy is
notice to the insurance carrier within the insurance policy period.”) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we conclude that Prodigy’s obligation to provide AESIC with notice of a claim “as
soon as practicable” was not a material part of the bargained-for exchange under this claims-
made policy. See Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 693 (“In determining the materiality of a breach,
courts will consider, among other things, the extent to which the nonbreaching party will be
deprived of the benefit that it could have reasonably anticipated from full performance.”) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241(a) (1981)). As AESIC has admitted that it was not
prejudiced by the delay in receiving notice, it could not deny coverage based on Prodigy’s alleged
failure to provide notice “as soon as practicable.” See PAJ, 243 S.W.3d at 636-37.
In a claims-made policy, when an insured notifies its insurer of a claim within the policy term or
other reporting period that the policy specifies, the insured’s failure to provide notice “as soon as
practicable” will not defeat coverage in the absence of prejudice to the insurer. Accordingly,
we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, render judgment that AESIC cannot deny coverage
because of Prodigy’s alleged failure to give notice “as soon as practicable,” and remand the
remaining issues to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(d).
Wallace B. Jefferson
OPINION DELIVERED: March 27, 2009
 Respondent Great American Insurance Company’s Executive Liability Division was responsible for
underwriting and claims administration of D&O policies issued by AESIC, including the one issued in this
 With respect to claims against FlashNet itself, coverage was provided solely by operation of
Endorsement 16, which added the following insuring agreement: “if, during the Policy Period or the
Discovery Period, any Securities Claim is first made against the Company for a Wrongful Act the Insurer will
pay on behalf of the Company all Loss which the Company is legally obligated to pay.”
 As prominently stated on the declarations page, the policy “D[ID] NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY DUTY BY
THE INSURER TO DEFEND THOSE INSURED UNDER THE POLICY.” This is standard for D&O policies.
See 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 12A.05 (2006).
 The original “notice of claim” provision, found in section VII of the policy, required that the Insureds “as
a condition precedent to their rights . . . give the Insurer notice . . . as soon as practicable . . . but in no
event later than ninety (90) days after such Claim is made . . . .”
 As noted above, the Discovery Period expired on May 31, 2003. Thus, the notice provision required
that notice of a claim be given “as soon as practicable . . ., but in no event later than” August 29, 2003.
 AESIC’s letter stated in part:
As I advised you in telephone conversations on June 9, 2003 and June 11, 2003, AESIC is not participating
in the [IPO litigation] and has not signed the relevant agreements. I also advised you that AESIC had not
received any written notice of any lawsuit involving FlashNet Communications, Inc. In fact, your June 6,
2003 letter appears to be the first notice of this matter to AESIC. However, such notice was not in
compliance with the [Policy’s requirements] (including Section VII) [“The Notice of Claim” provision], which
are a condition precedent to any rights under the Policy. Furthermore, both the Policy Period and
Discovery Period expired prior to your June 6, 2003 letter. Under the circumstances there is no coverage
for this matter under the Policy.
 It should be noted that “[m]any courts fail to distinguish between claims-made and claims-made-and-
reported policies, and simply speak in broad terms of ‘claims-made’ policies.” Textron, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 639 A.2d 1358, 1362 n.2 (R.I. 1994). As one court has explained:
[T]he only true mark of a “claims made” [policy] is that it provides coverage for any claim first asserted
against the insured during the policy period, regardless of when the incident giving rise to the claim
occurred. Whether reporting to the insurer [i]s also a condition of coverage depends on the terms of the
In this regard, there is a distinction between a “claims made” policy and a “claims made and reported”
policy: “Whereas the former requires only that a claim be made within the policy period, the latter also
requires that the claim be reported to the insurance company within the policy period.”
Jones v. Lexington Manor Nursing Ctr., L.L.C., 480 F. Supp. 2d 865, 868 (S.D. Miss. 2006)(quoting
Chicago Ins. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 3-96-CV-3179R., 1998 WL 51363, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 1998) (mem.)); see also Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Federal Ins. Co., 307 F.3d
944, 955-56 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that claims-made policy that required insured to provide notice of
claims “‘as soon as practicable’” but “did not require that the claims be reported within the policy period, or
even within a specific number of days thereafter” could “[not] be treated as a claims-made-and-reported
policy”); Textron, 639 A.2d at 1361 n.2 (noting that “[a]bsent a provision requiring notice within a set period
after policy expiration, standard claims-made policies ‘implicitly allow * * * reporting of the claim to the
insurer after the policy period, as long as it is within a reasonable time’”) (quoting 2 Rowland Long, The
Law of Liability Insurance, § 12A.05[3A] at 40 (Supp. 1991)).
Although Prodigy’s policy is labeled a “claims-made policy,” its requirement that notice of a claim be given
“as soon as practicable during the Policy Period,. . . but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the
expiration of the Policy Period, or Discovery Period” is characteristic of a “claims-made-and-reported
policy”. See 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law of Liability Insurance § 12A.05[3A] (2006) (“The distinction
between ‘claims made’ and ‘claims made and reported’ policies is not necessarily apparent on the face of
the policies, since disclosure regulations generally require only that the legend ‘claims made’ be placed on
the policy. The distinction is typically evident in the notice of claims provision of the policy.”).
 As one treatise notes:
Courts too often speak broadly of the [claims-made] policy's “notice requirement,” without specifying which
requirement is at issue, and make broad pronouncements about the effect of noncompliance with the
unspecified “notice requirement.” Alternatively, courts may speak in terms of the insured's “untimely
notice,” and proceed to determine the effect of the untimeliness, without specifying which of the notice
requirements is at issue. 13 Couch on Insurance 3D § 186:13.
 See also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Willis, 296 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The
purpose of claims-made policies, unlike occurrence policies, is to provide exact notice periods that limit
liability to a fixed period of time ‘after which an insurer knows it is no longer liable under the policy, and for
this reason such reporting requirements are strictly construed.’”)(emphasis added)(quoting Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Ayo, 31 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir.1994)); F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994)
(noting that “[t]he notice requirements in claims made policies allow the insurer to ‘close its books’ on a
policy at its expiration and thus to ‘attain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence
policies’”) (quoting Burns v. Int’l Ins. Co., 709 F. Supp. 187, 191 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1422 (9th
 See, e.g., Chas. T. Main, 551 N.E.2d at 30; Matador Petroleum Corp., 174 F.3d at 656, 658; Lexington
Ins. Co. v. St. Louis Univ., 88 F.3d 632, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1996)(where claims-made policy provided that the
insured “‘shall give’ [insurer] notice of each claim ‘as soon as practicable,’ and in any event, ‘during the
period of this Policy,’” insurer “need not prove prejudice to deny coverage if the [insured] failed to report
the [claim] within the policy term”)(emphasis added); DiLuglio v. New England Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 355, 356,
359 (1st Cir. 1992) (where policy provided that insurance company would pay “‘any claim or claims ... first
made against the Insured and reported to the Company during the policy period’” “prejudice may be
presumed where notice is not provided within the policy period”)(emphasis added); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Talcott, 931 F.2d 166, 168 (1st Cir. 1991) (same); Burns v. Int’l Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1423-25 (9th
Cir. 1991) (notice-prejudice rule did not apply to claims-made policy that covered “claims made against the
insureds during the policy period . . . notice of which claim is received by the company within sixty days
following the termination of the policy period”); Esmailzadeh v. Johnson and Speakman, 869 F.2d 422, 424
(8th Cir. 1989); Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 396-97, 405-06 (N.J. 1985) (where
policy covered “claims first made against the insured and reported to the [Insurer] during the policy period”
insurer was not required to demonstrate prejudice to deny coverage based on notice given ten months
after policy expired).
 Because we hold that AESIC cannot deny Prodigy coverage for the FlashNet claim, we do we do not
consider Prodigy’s contention that AESIC was precluded from enforcing the notice provision because the
policy was sold in violation of the surplus lines statute.